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Commenting on "Purpose" in the Uniform 
Commercial Code 
PETER A. ALcES* 
DAVID FRisCH** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The first word must be Karl Llewellyn's: 
[C]onstruction and application are mtellectually unpossible except with 
reference to some reason and theory of purpose and orgamzation. Borderline, 
doubtful, or uncontemplated cases are mevitable. Reasonably uniform 
mterpretation by jUdges of different schooling, learnmg and skill ts 
tremendously furthered if the reason which gwdes application of the same 
language ts the same reason m all cases. A patent reason, moreover, 
tremendously decreases the leeway open to the skillful advocate for persuastve 
distortion or mtsapplication of the language; it reqwres that any contention, to 
be successfully persuastve, must make some kmd of sense zn terms of the 
reason; it provtdes a real stimulus toward, though not an assurance of, 
corrective growth rather than straitjacketing of the Code by way of caselaw .1 
The best statute could not anticipate every contingency and the best drafters 
must recogmze the perils of writing in too particular terms. Any effort to 
construe and apply particular Uniform Commeraal Code ("Code" or "UCC") 
proVISions m a manner mdulgent of a "purposive" approach reqwres that the 
statute's purpose be manifest. If the statute's reason 1S clear, if the scope of a 
proVISion's influence 1S revealed by its operation m the easy cases, then the 
difficult cases will not tug at the fabric of the law and render the statute a nullity 
when the enacted law most needs to matter. Hard law makes bad cases. 
This Article descn"bes the congruities and incongruities of applying a 
purposive interpretation to Code provisions. We intend nothing provocative; 
indeed, it would be provocative to suggest that a livmg organiSm such as the 
UCC should be applied in a manner mconsiderate of its "purpose." Our obJect 
is to come to terms with the sources of purpose. What 1S it that counsel, courts, 
*Professor of Law, College of William and Mary School of Law. 
**Professor of Law, Widener Umversity School of Law. 
1 Collection of Karl Llewellyn Papers, (J)(VI)(i)(e) at 5 (1994) [hereinafter Karl 
Llewellyn Papers] (unpublished manuscnpt on file at Uruversity of Clncago Law School), 
quoted zn Wn..LIAM TwiNING, KARL Ll.Ew:EILYN AND TilE REALisT MOVEMENT 321-22 
(1973). 
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and transactors, for that matter, need in order to discern the law's reason that 
will detennine their bargain, their rights when the bargain fails? 
In Part II of this Article, we focus on section 1-102 of the Code, which 
establishes the prominence of purpose and policy in the construction and 
application of the UCC. A survey of pertinent history puts the findings of our 
empirical study into perspective. Then, in Part ill, we examine the sources of 
"purposive" analysis (other than 1-102) that inform Code practice. We also 
come to terms with the role of "legislative history," including the official 
comments to the Code. Part N provides a foundation for a critique of reliance 
on the official commentary. After describing the Code drafting process and 
considering analogous sources of official commentary, we conclude that the 
comments are a dubious source of legislative purpose. Ultimately, you might 
conclude that the UCC comments, though dressed-up, are attired no better than 
the notorious Emperor. 
ll. COURTS AND UCC SECTION 1-102 
In this Part, we undertake two tasks. First, we outline the origins of 
subsections (1) and (2) of section 1-102,2 and we explore some of the efforts by 
its drafters to mediate the perceived tension among some of its provisions. 
Second, we consider the effects of these two subsections by analyzing their use 
in court opinions. Our goal is to form some general impressions about the 
extent to which and for what purposes judges have relied expressly on 
subsections (1) and (2) in making their decisions. Our findings suggest that the 
purposes and policies set forth in section 1-102 have been the source of both 
broad and narrow interpretations of the language in particular sections. Courts 
also have responded to these purposes and policies as a source of confusion, as 
a mandate for values that courts cannot always harmonize. 
2 These subsections read as follows: 
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes 
and polices. 
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are: 
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; 
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage 
and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make unifonn the law among the various jurisdictions. 
u.c.c. §§ 1-102(1}, (2) (1995). 
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A. Historical Notes 
None of the earlier uniform acts superseded by the Code contained 
provisions similar to all of those set forth in the current version of subsections 
(1) and (2). They did, however, all provide in the same language that each Act 
"shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it. "3 The text and background 
of this provision suggest a firm belief in the need for judicial checks on 
nonuniformity, particularly with respect to the interpretation of uniform laws. 
In short, this statutory directive recognized that the very arguments that called 
for uniform statutory law raised sharp questions about whether judicial 
interpretation of these statutes should continue to be independent from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 4 
3 Uniform Trust Receipts Act §.18 (1933); Uniform Conditional Sales Act §.30 (1918); 
Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 19 (1909); Uniform Bills of Lading Act § 52 (1909); Uniform 
Warehouse Receipts Act§ 57 (1906); Uniform Sales Act§ 74 (1906). Although a provision 
calling for uniform construction was not included in the Uniform Negotiable lnstnonents Act 
of 1986, courts recognized that in order to accomplish the Act's objectives, the decisioru; of 
other states should be taken into account. See, e.g., Broderick v. Bascom Rope, 142 N.Y.S. 
497 (Sup. Ct. 1913). 
4 See 1 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REvisiON COMM'N REPoRT: SnJDy OF TilE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 134 (reprinted. 1980) {1,955) [hereinafter N.Y. Co.MM'NREPoRT] ("The 
practical importance of statutory provisioru; stating a purpose of uniformity is to be found in 
the rule that decisioru; in other states construing the same provision of a uniform act are 
particularly persuasive when the same provision is before the court for the first time."). 
Indeed, the Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB") for the Uniform Commercial Code was 
created precisely because it would be in a position to help promote uniformity. See Report 
No.1 of the PEB for the UCC (Oct 31, 1962), 1 U.L.A. XXV, XXVll (1976) ("It shall be 
the policy of the [PEB] to assist in attaining and maintaining uniformity in state statutes 
governing commercial transactioru; and to this end to approve a minimum number of 
amendments to the Code."). As Llewellyn put it when drafting a Revised Uniform Sales Act: 
"[U]niformity of intent, construction and application is no less important to the dominant 
purpose of this Act than uniformity of language .... " REPoRT AND SECOND DRAFT: 
REvisED UNIFORM SALES Acr § 1-A(2) {1941). See also the introductory comment to the 
Code, which provides in pertinent part: 
Unifonnity throughout American jurisdictions is one of the main objectives of this Code; 
and that objective cannot be obtained without substantial tmifonnity of construction. To 
aid in tmifonn construction of this [c]omment and those which follow the text of each 
section set forth the purpose of various provisions of this Act to promote tmifonnity, to 
aid in viewing the Act as an integrated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction. 
U.C.C. 1 (1995) (General Comment of National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
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The March 1951 Draft of the Code first stated a rule of construction most 
similar to the present subsections (1) and (2). It provided: 
(1) This Act shall be hrerally construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies. 
(2) The underlying purposes and policies of this Act are 
(a) to simplify and modernize and develop greater precision and certa.incy 
in the rules of law governing commercial transactions; 
(b) to preserve flexibility in commercial transactions and to encourage 
continued expansion of commercial practices and mechanisms through custom, 
usage and agreement of the parties; 
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions. 5 
Subsection (1) was sufficient to dispose of the principle that statutes in 
derogation of the common law should be narrowly construed. 6 This provision 
might well be defended on the ground that the resolution of ambiguities in 
statutes is sometimes a question of policy as much as it is law, and that courts 
are often uniquely well situated to make the relevant policy decisions. 
Frequently, legislation will not deal specifically \vith the precise question at 
issue. If the language of the statute does not serve as a clear predicate for a 
decision one way or the other, contesting versions of what the legislature 
intended will call for an assessment of which outcome is most sensible under 
the circumstances. This assessment is not the mechanical exercise of uncovering 
an actual legislative decision. It calls for a judgment undertaken in light of the 
statutory structure and applicable policy considerations} 
State Laws ("NCCUSL ") and the American Law Institute ("ALI")). 
The objective of uniformity extends beyond the same legal construction in all the states 
that enact the uniform provisions. It also includes conformity with federal law, see 
Commercial Nat'l Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-La. Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520, 528 
(1916) ("This rule of construction requires that in order to accomplish the beneficent objective 
of unifying ••• the commercial law of the country, there should be taken into consideration 
the fundamental purpose of the Uniform Act .... "), and international commercial law, see 
generally Peter Wmship, Domesticating International Conunercial Law: Revising U.C.C. 
Article 2 in light of the United Nations Sales Convention, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 43 (1991) ~ 
(Comparing the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
with UCC Article 2). 
5 XII EuzAmml S. KE.u.Y, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFrS 26 (1984). 
6 For a general discussion of this principle, see Jefferson B. Fordham & Russell Leach, 
Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the ComnwnLaw, 3 VAND. L. REv. 438 (1950). 
7 A typically classical statement on the distinction between a liberal and strict 
construction of a statute reads as follows: 
[A] statute is liberally construed when [the] letter [of the statute] is extended to include 
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To be sure, this call for a hberal construction was not entirely new. Indeed, 
the commentary on subsection (1) points out that courts have repeatedly applied 
the uniform commercial acts hberally. 
The case law is summarized as follows: 
Courts have been careful to keep broad acts from being hampered in their 
effects by later acts of limited scope. They have recognized the policies 
embodied in an act as applicable in reason to subject-matter which was not 
expressly included in the language of the act. They have done the same where 
reason and policy so required, even where the subject-matter had been 
intentionally excluded from the act in general. They have implemented a 
statutory policy with hberal and useful remedies not provided in the statutory 
text. They have disregarded a statutory limitation of remedy where the reason 
of the limitation did not apply. Nothing in this Act stands in the way of the 
continuance of such action by the courts. 8 
In contrast to subsection (1), the provisions of subsection (2) generated 
some controversy. The main problem was the relationship between "precision 
and certainty," which are mentioned in paragraph (a), and "flexibility," 
mentioned in paragraph (b). 9 We assume that most practicing attorneys and 
most sitting judges believe that one important end of a commercial code is legal 
certainty. Practitioners must be able to predict the legal effect of various forms 
of business activity and judges require doctrine that is certain and easy to 
apply .10 On the other hand, the drafters clearly understood that sometimes 
matters within the spirit or purpose of the statute. A statute is strictly construed when 
[the] letter [of the statute] is narrowed to exclude matters which if included would defeat 
the policy of the legislation. 
Norman J. Singer, 8urHERLAND STATIITORY CONSI'RUCTION § 58.06 {Clark Boardman 
Callaghan 5th ed., 1992). 
8 U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1995) (citations omitted). 
9 Another point of contention was the meaning of "commercial mechanism" in 
paragraph (b). See N.Y. CoMM'N REPoRT, supra note 4, at 141 ("The meaning of 
'commercial mechanism' is not apparent."). Note the basic distinction between this provision 
and section 1-205 ("Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade"). In cases involving the 
interpretation of the parties' agreement, section 1-205 governs the problem. But in cases 
involving statutory interpretation, the provisions of section 1-102 are determinative. See id. 
10 See, e.g., Donald J. Rapson, lWw is Looking Out for the Public Interest? 11wughts 
About the UCC Revision Process in the light (and Shaduws) of Professor Rubin's 
Observations, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 249, 257 (1994) ("I start with the basic premise that the 
public interest is best served by having clear, concise, and efficient sta.nltory rules so that the 
parties to a transaction can anticipate the issues and answers that may arise and guide their 
actions accordingly."). 
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codification fails because of the excessive rigidity of statutory commands. In 
light of the wide variety of contexts to which the Code must be applied, a 
degree of flexibility in implementation is quite healthy.ll 
There is another reason for espousing a flexible approach to statutory 
construction. Sometimes codification is made more difficult because of the 
pervasive problem of changed circumstances. New developments involving 
technological capacity and business practices give rise to a serious risk of 
obsolescence.12 Because the Code cannot be amended often enough to account 
for these changes, genuine problems arise for those who must apply the 
Code.13 In these circumstances, a grant of interpretive authority to courts, 
allowing them to take changed circumstances into consideration, seems to be a 
valuable, if partial, corrective.14 
As critics of subsection (2) emphasized, however, there would be some 
11 This point is made by Grant Gilmore with considerable force: 
[I]t is a matter of vital importance that the Code as a whole be kept in terms of such 
generality as to allow an easy and unstrained application of its provisions to new patterns 
of business behavior. Commercial codification cannot successfully over particularize: the 
penalty for being too precise is that the stantte will have to keep coming in for repairs 
(and amendment is a costly, cumbersome, and unsatisfactory process) or else become a 
dead-letter. 
Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 51 YALE L.J. 1341, 1355 
(1948). 
12 For a catalogue of the commercial innovations that have arisen since the adoption of 
the Code, see John F. Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and the Unifonn Commercial 
Code, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 579 {1993). 
13 See Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking 
Process of Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REv. 909, 918 (1995) ("It takes anywhere from 
three to five years for a statutory change to have been studied, drafted, and first proposed for 
legislative enactment. This requires an enormous devotion of human and professional 
capital."). 
14 From its inception, the Code was perceived by its drafters to be "a semi-permanent 
piece of legislation." U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 1 (1995). In particular, we are told in comment 1 
to section l-102, that the drafters intended "to make it possible for the law embodied in this 
Act to be developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances and 
practices." Id. Notwithstanding this original intent, the Code has continued to thrive as the 
primaly source of commercial law only because of the willingness of the NCCUSL and the 
ALI to revise and refine its provisions when necessary. See Agreement Describing the 
Relationship of the American Law Institute, the National Coriference of Commissioners on 
Unijonn State Laws, and the Pennanent Editorial Board with Resped to the Unijonn 
Commercial Code, 1987 A.L.I. PR.oc. 769, 770 [hereinafter Agreement] (discussing the need 
to revise the Code when necessary). 
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difficulty in administering the contradictory objectives of flexibility and 
certainty ,15 The American Bankers Association went even further, flatly stating 
that the provisions in subsections (1) and (2) direct courts to proceed in what 
appear to be four different directions. The four are "h'berally," "precision," 
"fleXIbility," and "uniform. "16 To meet this criticism, these two subsections 
were redrafted in 1956 into what is now the present text of section 1-102.17 
To begin to understand the judicial use of the Code's purposes and policies 
in construing Code sections, we look at the cases to see how often subsections 
(1) and (2) are brought into court opinions and the implications of their use. 
This would permit something akin to a legal impact statement, helping to 
determine the extent to which these subsections have actually contributed to the 
resolution of Code construction problems. 
B. The Empirical Study 
In the fall of 1995, we used the Uniform Commercial Code Reporting 
Service18 to initially determine the frequency of judicial citation to subsections 
(1) and (2). In all, the study turned up more than 300 different cases that cited 
one or both of the subsections. When a subsection was cited, we attempted to 
make a general assessment of its use by the judge writing the opinion. In this 
review of the cases and reflection on their meaning, we discerned that the Code 
policies enumerated in subsections (1) and (2) add an extra layer of 
empowerment and discretion, but they do not provide an extra layer of 
guidance and control. 
At this juncture, we emphasize that this exercise in empiricism is not 
intended to be rigorous. The overwhelming bulk of our research lacks any but 
the most primitive controls, and much of it lacks even that. To answer with 
certainty the question of whether subsections (1) and (2) have had an impact on 
commercial law, it is not enough to look .only at the explicit language of the 
15 See, e.g., N.Y. CoMM'N REPoRT, supra note 4, at 138-39 (suggesting that these two 
objectives "may be not complimentary, but contradictory objectives"); Charles H. Willard, 
The History of the Uniform Commercial Code, document 29 at 1 (unpublished private history 
of the UCC on file in the Davis Polk and Wardell library in New York) ("The LRC 
Committee's point that precision and flexibility do not go together is well taken."); see also 
President and Dirs. of Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 150 N.E. 594,599 (N.Y. 1926) ("One of 
the debit items to be charged against codifYing statutes is the possibility of interference with 
evolutionary growth. It is the ancient conflict between flexibility and certainty."). 
16 See Report of Special Committee of the American Bankers Association 14 (Oct. 17, 
1954). 
17 See Willard; supra note 15, document48, at2-4. 
18 See U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) (1986). We surveyed volumes 1-42 (original series) 
and 1-20 (2d series). 
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cases. Even in those instances in which one of the subsections appears in a 
citation that includes multiple sources of authority, or, if it was singled out, it 
did not seem to weigh heavily in the eventual decision, we cannot be absolutely 
sure what influence it had, if any, on the court's resolution of the case.19 There 
are a host of subtle processes through which Code purposes and policies can 
affect the outcome of a case yet not result in extensive discussion. For example, 
a court may be swayed more readily by arguments that use subsections (1) and 
(2), or it may rely on a case which itself was influenced by these subsections. 
We believe that the cases enable us to develop a meaningful picture of the 
role played by the Code's purposes and policies. All real data have certain 
limitations. We have no reason to think that as an answer to the central 
question, the cases may misdirect more than they infonn. 
Some courts appear to draw ties between the purposes and policies outlined 
in section 1-102 and the specific language used in a Code section. That is to 
say, more than one court acted as if following the literal language of the Code 
gave rise to a presumption of compliance with the mandate expressed in section 
1-102. For example, in White v. Hancock Bank,2o the Mississippi Supreme 
Court refused to allow the payee of a fraudulent check to shift its loss to the 
depository-collecting bank in the absence of any attempt to show bad faith on 
the part of the bank.21 The court considered but then rejected the idea that 
"extra-legal notions of fairness and justice" should be given any weight.22 In 
fact, the opinion's penultimate paragraph is a ringing endorsement of literalism: 
The statutorily declared purposes and policies of the UCC include "to simplify, 
clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions" regarding 
19 Often judges merely refer to one or more of the purposes and policies set forth in 
section 1-102 at the beginning or end of their analyses as if it were a necessary invocation, 
see, e.g., In re PA Record Outlet, 7 U.C;C Rep. Serv. (CBC) 300 (W.D. Pa. 1988); In re 
Bennett, 6 U.C.C Rep. Serv. (CBC) 994 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1969); Kearney & Trecker 
Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 527 A.2d 429 (N.J. 1987}, or benediction, see, e.g., 
Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965); E.S.P., Inc. v. Midway Nat'l Bank, 447 
N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1989); Welland Inv. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 195 A.2d 210 (N.J. 
Super. 1963}, of commercial law. 
20 477 So. 2d 265 (Miss. 1985). For additional cases suggesting that a literal reading of 
Code language furthers Code policies, see In re Zwagerman, 115 B.R. 540 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 1990}, qff'd, 125 B.R. 486 (W.D. Mich. 1991); In re Callahan Motors, Inc., 396 F. 
Supp. 785 (D.C. N.J. 1975), rev'd, 538 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Wolf, 9 U.C.C Rep. 
Serv. (CBC) 177 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1971); In re Antekeier, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 
1027 {Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1969); In re Carlstrom, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 766 (Bankr. 
D. Me. 1966). 
21 See Hancock Bank, 477 So. 2d at 273. 
22Jd. 
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the subjects of commercial paper and bank deposits and collections, the Code 
places a premium upon achievement of certainty in rules and obligations and 
predictability of consequences of behavior, for the notions of commercial 
justice and fairness that went into the shaping of Articles 3 and 4 would be 
seriously undermined by anything other than our sticking as closely as possible 
to the letter of the law. 23 
427 
In contrast to those courts which have suggested that compliance with 
section 1-102 requires the application of the "plain language" of other Code 
sections, many courts have perceived the section as a source of authority for 
liberal, pragmatic interpretations of the Code. Thus, we have found that courts 
have often used section 1-102 as a source of authority to supersede the 
requirements and conditions set forth in particular rules. For example, in 
Strevell-Paterson Finance Co. v. May,24 the New Mexico Supreme Court held 
that a liberal construction of the requirements of Article 9 should dispense with 
the signature requirement of section 9-402(1).25 In another case, the court 
thought it irrelevant that under the circumstances the buyer's demand for 
adequate assurance of performance under section 2-609 was not in writing.26 
Many "hard" cases implicate a wide diversity of policies. Because these 
policies often conflict, they must be ordered to determine which ought to be 
satisfied when we cannot satisfy all. Section 1-102 supposes that courts can 
combine these diverse policies into a single, consistent, preference ranking. 
This supposition, however, fails to do justice to the policies embodied in the 
diverse kinds of claims. Many of these policies are so distinct as to be 
incommensurable. 
Consider, for example, the policies of uniformity and h"berality of 
construction. In In re Causer's Town & Country Super Market, Inc., 27 the court 
took exception to those cases that had refused to condemn as ineffective a 
financing statement that failed to contain the information required by section 9-
402(1).28 According to the court, "[s]uch h"berality seems ... to defeat the very 
23 Id. 
24 422 P.2d 366 (N.M. 1967). 
25 See id. at 369. 
26 See AMF, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 536 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1976). For 
additional cases noting that liberality rather than restriction of interpretation is necessacy to 
fulfill the purpose and the spirit underlying the Code, see In re Purity Ice Cream Co., 90 B.R. 
183 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988), In re Piro, 331 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Cal. 1971), Maryland Nat'l 
Bank v. Poner-Way Harvester Mfg. Co., 300 A.2d 8 (Del. 1972), and Alloway v. Stuart, 385 
S.W.2d 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964). 
27 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 541 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1965). 
28 See id. at 546 
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uniformity sought by the Uniform Commercial Code. "29 In another case, Ditch 
Witch Trenching Co. v. C & S Carpentry Services, Inc.,3o the court rejected the 
majority rule (thereby promoting nonuniformity) that section 1-207 was not 
intended to bar application of the accord and satisfaction doctrine.31 In its view, 
"a liberal construction ... compels the conclusion that the common law 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction has been superseded by the passage of this 
statute."32 
Even if the possibility of coherent statutory interpretation is not undermined 
by the complexities of balancing the elements of section 1-102, courts must also 
consider a plethora of other pervasive Code purposes and policies.33 But the 
cases offer little analysis as to how such purposes and policies ought to be 
recognized or conceived. Moreover, all of this is of little help in addressing the 
common circumstance in which purposes and policies may pull a court in 
different directions. 
The use of court opinions to describe reactions to and use of section 1-102 
is often made difficult by the fact that the decision may be consistent with the 
underlying purposes and policies of the Code, both in general and specifically 
with the underlying purpose and policy of the section under consideration. In 
evaluating cases, we might conclude then, that judicial references to general 
policies to secure resolutions on the merits may be misleading. In other words, 
29 Id. at 547; see also In re Broward Auto Brokers, Inc., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) 
402, 404 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1972) ("If each court or each jurisdiction went along its merry 
way waiving one or more specific requirements of the act in order to liberally construe the 
act, there would probably be a complete lack of uniformity."). 
30 812 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991). 
31 See id. at 173. 
32Id. 
33 Just some of the Code policies located outside of section 1-102 include finality of 
commercial transactions, see Fuscellaro v. Industrial Nat'l Corp., 368 A.2d 1227, 1231 (R.I. 
1977); the avoidance of "expensive and delaying litigation," see Von Gohren v. Pacific Nat'l 
Bank, 505 P.2d 467, 474 (Wash. 1973); the allocation of liability and responsibility to the 
party best able to prevent them, see Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. American Express Co., 
542 N.E.2d 1090, 1096 (N.Y. 1989); freedom to contract, see Keller v. A.O. Smith 
Harvestore Prods., Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 74 (Colo. 1991); and "commercial reasonableness and 
preserving expectations," see Schwarcz, supra note 13, at 922. 
Additionally, courts must also consider purposes and policies that are reflected in statutes 
external to the Code. See, e.g., In re Eagles Nest, Inc., 57 B.R. 337 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) 
(where liquor licenses are concerned, the policies behind both the UCC and the Alcoholic 
Beverage Laws must be considered); Vedder v. Spellman, 480 P.2d 21fT (Wash. 1971) 
(stating that notwithstanding section 3-801(1)(b), a payee may not sue on a dishonored check 
where action on the underlying contract was barred by a state statute providing that an 
unlicensed contractor may not maintain an action for compensation). 
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one could take the view that even though Code policies were drawn upon, the 
court was guided primarily by other concerns. 34 Indeed, the claim that specific 
policies are hierarchically superior to general considerations of simplification, 
clarification, modernization, expansion, and uniformity-that the specific 
"trumps" the general-has become an increasingly prominent theme in the 
Code literature. 35 
In sum, then, it seems to us that the difficulty in defining and ordering 
terms such as "simplification," "clarification," and "modernization" suggests 
their inability to act as practical guides that limit the exercise of discretion. As 
one commentator recognized: 
[S]tating that the Code is to be interpreted to further objectives does not in itself 
provide a precise standard for the determination of the outcome of a particular 
controversy. Otherwise stated, the mandate to interpret the Code so as to 
further its objectives does not furnish any real guide to construction because the 
purposes are of "an essentially neutral nature" and "a great deal will depend 
upon the vantage point of the one contemplating the problem. "36 
34 See, e.g., Barber-Greene Co. v. National Bank, 816 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(exemplifying a ruling consistent with the policy expressed by the drafters in section 1-
201(39)); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Decker Coal Co., 653 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. lll. 1987) 
(exemplifying a ruling consistent with the policy expressed by the drafters in section 1-106); 
Todsen v. Runge, 318 N.W.2d 88 (Neb. 1982) (exemplifying a ruling consistent with the 
policy expressed in section 9-312(5)); USX Corp. v. Union Pacific Resources Co., 753 
S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (the court's ruling is consistent with the policy expressed 
by the drafters in section 1-106); see also JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERs, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE§ 4, at 16 (3d ed. 1988) ("Because courts so commonly cite not only 1-
102, but also some more specific liberalizing section, it is difficult to know whether 1-102 
independently influences liberal interpretation and construction."). 
35 See, e.g., DONAlD KING, 'fHE NEW CONCEPIUAUSM OFTIIE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE 12 (1968) ("[T]he more generalized overall purposes are at times so general as to 
permit diverse interpretation and application. It is only by looking at the individual policies 
involved that a consistent interpretation by courts may be maintained .... "). 
36 RONAlD A. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102:41, at 51 (3d ed. 
1981). Referring to the objectives stated in section 1-102, Julian B. McDonnell wrote in a 
similar vein that 
those objectives are stated with a generality that diminishes their usefulness. They may, 
in fact, also point in different directions. A court faced with the problem of the financing 
statement as a security agreement today would have to contend with the policy of 
simplification in section l-102(2)(a), which supports the recognition of a financing 
statement as security agreement, and the policy of uniformity in section 1-102(2)(c), 
which, in light of the case law, supports the contraiy result. Moreover, how is the jurist 
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It is not surprising, then, to see the wide range of approaches and effects 
that courts associate with section 1-102. With the foregoing account of the 
indeterminacy of the Code's general policies as a foundation, we now consider 
where to find the purposes and policies of individual Code sections. 
ill. OTHER SOURCES OF CODE PURPoSES 
We have focused thus far on criticizing the generality of section 1-102 and 
have called into question the particular conception of intelligibility that it 
presupposes. This Part of the Article turns to other sources for ascnbing a 
meaning or purpose to a Code section. Our strategy in this Part is twofold. 
First, we identify some of the traditional sources for locating the purposes and 
policies of individual sections, and we illuminate the ways in which these 
sources are inherently incapable of guiding courts to consistent decisions. 
Second, we develop an account of the aims and justifications for the official 
comments that follow each section. We conclude that the comments are the one 
place where the meaning of legislative decisions could be determined and given 
content. 
A. The Explicit lmzguage of the Text 
Some commentators have suggested that the objectives of a section can 
sometimes be gleaned from the explicit language of the Code. Professor 
Hillman, for example, points out that courts routinely ignore the last sentence of 
section 2-708(2) in lost volume seller cases in order to carry out the stated 
purpose of the section, which is to put the seller "in as good a position as 
performance would have done. "37 To the extent that this view rests exclusively 
on the premise that a statute can express a meaningful purpose, it is mistaken. 
There is simply no way to determine from the text alone what the drafters 
would have done with an unforeseen problem had that problem been presented 
to them.38 
to assess which alternative will modernize the law governing commercial transactions in 
accordance with section 1-102{2)(a)? 
Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive lntepretation of the Unifonn Commercial Code: Some 
Implications for Jwisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 851-52 (1978). 
37 Robert A. Hillman, Construction of the Unifonn Commercial Code: UCC Section 1-
103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 655, 680-81 (1971). 
38 Apart from the inevitable indeterminacy of statutory formulations, see, e.g., Anthony 
D'Amato, Cowzterintuitive Consequences of "Plain Meaning," 33 Aruz. L. REv. 529 
(1991), inherent in any piece of legislation is what Professor Hart has called an 
"indeterminacy of aim." H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEE'f OF LAW 125 (1961). To make this 
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Consider the case of a seller who holds completed goods on hand that are 
unsold at the time of trial. If the market price has fallen since the time of tender, 
where does that leave her? Under 2-708(1), there is little doubt that the seller is 
entitled to "the difference between the market price at the time and place for 
tender and the unpaid contract price together with any incidental 
damages ... but less expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach. "39 
The problem is that an award under this subsection would not necessarily put 
the seller in the same economic position she would have been in but for the 
breach. 40 Can the seller now insist that her damages be determined by the lost 
profit formula of subsection (2)? The buyer would argue that the seller, who 
suffered no loss of volume, does not fall within any of the classes of sellers who 
have traditionally been permitted to proceed using 2-708.41 Moreover, if the 
seller does have rights under subsection (2), the court must take into account the 
fact that the seller still holds the goods, which can be sold. 42 
point, Hart posits an ordinance barring vehicles from a public park. Although it may be clear 
that if the pmpose of the law is to maintain peace and quiet the legislature intended to banish 
cars, buses, and motorcycles, it is unclear what other "vehicles" it intended to exclude: 
We have initially settled the question that piece and quiet in the park is to be maintained 
at the cost, at any rate, of the exclusion of these things. On the other hand, until we have 
put the general aim of peace in the park into conjunction with those cases which we did 
not, or perhaps could not, initially envisage (perhaps a toy motor-car electrically 
propelled) our aim is, in this direction indeterminate. We have not settled, because we 
have not anticipated, the question which will be raised by the unenvisaged case when it 
occurs: whether some degree of peace in the park is to be sacrificed to, or defended 
against, those children whose pleasure or interest it is to use these things. 
Id. at 126. 
39 u.c.c. § 2-708(1) (1995). 
40 Such would be the case, for example, if the seller eventually resold the goods at a 
lower price than the market price on the date of tender. 
41 These include the lost volume seller whose supply of goods exceeds the demand, see, 
e.g., R.E. Davis Chern. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 826 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1987); Teradyne, 
Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 676 F.2d 865 (1st Cir. 1982), the seller who stops production 
after breach, see, e.g., Bead Chain Mfg. Co. v. Saxton Prods., Inc., 439 A.2d 314 (Conn. 
1981); Detroit Power Screwdriver Co. v. Ladney, 181 N.W.2d 828 (Mich. App. Ct. 1970), 
and the seller who never acquires the goods, see, e.g., Blair Int'l, Ltd. v. La Barge, Inc., 675 
F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1982). See also Robert J. Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of 
Seller's Damages: Sales Act and Commercial Code Results Compared, 18 STAN. L. REv. 66 
(1965). 
42 On this point, Professors White and Summers write: 
If the seller still holds the goods at the time of trial, the court will still have to determine 
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Whether the stated purpose of full compensation found in section 2-708(2) 
ought to govern its application in the foregoing example remains an open 
question. The uncertainty here stems, in large measure, from the fact that 
permitting the seller to recover her lost profit may perhaps encourage sellers to 
forego commercially reasonable efforts to resell. 43 Thus, ascnbing a meaning 
or purpose to a Code provision is, in part, a process of determining how that 
particular provision might best be understood to fit with other statutory 
principles and policies. For this reason, we reject the view that the underlying 
objectives of a Code section can ever be deduced solely from the text. 
B. Resort to Prior Drafts 
It has been suggested that prior drafts and prior official texts of the Code 
can be significant resources for construing the purpose of Code sections.44 If, 
however, the current statutory text cannot express a meaningful pwpose, 
interpretation by reference to prior texts is also flawed. Any comparison of 
sections (past and present) has little relevance for determining the meaning of 
choices; as we have insisted, reasons and purposes are what count. 
It is interesting to note that the 1952 text of the Code contained a section 1-
a figure to include as due credit for a putative resale even though the seller bas not yet 
resold. If the court does not deduct some amount for due credit for resale, 2-708(2) will 
simply become a back door action for the price, and quite clearly the drafters did not 
intend that. 
JAMES J. WHITE & RoBERTS. SUMMERs, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 267 (4th ed. 1995). 
Moreover, unlike a direct action for the price under section 2-709, there is no explicit 
requirement in section 2-708(2) that the seller "hold the goods for the buyer." U.C.C. § 2-
709(2) (1995). 
43 Although Professors White and Summers recognize 
that this opportunity to receive a more ample recovery under 2-708(2) than would be 
available under 2-708(1) will encourage the [sellers] of th[e] world to forego resale and 
to lie in the Jolmson grass in hopes of a sizeable recovery under 2-708(2) and a later 
lucky resale at a higher price, 
they nonetheless "believe that the benefits to be gained [from the growth and development of 
2-708(2)) outweigh these costs." ld. at 269. Now that it appears that the new Article 2 ·will 
contain an express proviso that the nonbreacbing party is expected to mitigate damages, see 
U.C.C. § 2-703(b) (Discussion Draft Mar. 1, 1996), we hope that the courts will respond 
appropriately in circumstances where one is engaging in strategic activity. In any event, it 
seems obvious "that such cases will present novel and difficult questions both to the parties' 
lawyers and to the judges. Id. 
44 See McDonnell, supra note 36, at 8{r7. 
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102(3)(g), which provided: "Prior drafts of text and comments may not be used 
to ascertain legislative intent. "45 Notwithstanding the fact that paragraph (g) 
first appeared in 1952, the comment to paragraph (g) surfaced earlier in the 
Proposed Final Draft of 1950. It explained that resort to prior drafts was 
precluded because "[fjrequently matters have been omitted as being implicit 
without statement and language has been changed or added solely for clarity. 
The only safe guide of intent lies in the final text and [c]omments. "46 
45 U.C.C. § 1-102(3)(g) (1952) (repealed 1956). 
46 N.Y. COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 4, at 165-66. Some insight into paragraph (g) was 
offered by Professor Carl Fulda: 
To understand the background of this provision, it is, perhaps, appropriate to recall 
that the two sponsoring organizations have worked on the Code for more than ten years. 
According to the statement following the title (pages 2 and 3 of the 1952 Official Draft), 
the preparation of the Code as a joint project of the two sponsoring lxxlies was begun on 
Janu:uy 1, 1954. But prior to that time the National Conference had been working on 
this project for several years. For instance, a Proposed Final Draft No. 1 of the Uniform 
Revised Sales Act, designated as "Sales Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code," was 
submitted to the Council of the American Law Institute at its meeting in May, 1944. In 
May, 1949 a draft of the entire Code was submitted by the two sponsoring organizations 
to the 26th Annual Meeting of the Institute, in joint session with the National 
Conference. In the spring of 1950 this was followed by a "Proposed Final Draft" of the 
entire Code. Additional revisions were made in 1951, and in 1952 the Institute and the 
Conference published the "Official Draft" which represent[s] the final product and 
contains for the first time present paragraph (g). 
However, even this was not final. Nwnerous recommendations for changes in the 
text and comments of the "Official Draft" were received by the Editorial Board. Many 
of these were approved by the two sponsoring organizations, and these changes were 
published late in 1953 in a Supplement to the 1952 Official Draft. 
In addition, the sponsoring organizations reopened consideration of. the Code for the 
purpose of studying the advisability of changes in the light of objections made at the 
various public hearings conducted by the Law Revision Commission from Febru:uy to 
April, 1954, and in the light of criticisms advanced in the study of the Code by the 
Commission and by agencies in other states. 
Section 1-102(3)(g), together with paragraph (f) referring to the [c]omments, 
constitutes an attempt to establish a proper boundary between what shall be considered as 
relevant "legislative history" and what shall not be so considered. The most diligent 
search has revealed no precedent for such a provision. 
The validity of such a provision is doubtful. Traditionally, the courts have 
determined what materials should be considered as relevant "legislative history"; in 
other words, the question of admissibility of extrinsic aids has been a matter for the 
court's decision, and courts have generally been liberal in examining "the events leading 
up to the introduction of the bill out of which the statute under consideration developed." 
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Subsequently, this provision was deleted from the Code. 47 While we do not 
wish to debate the wisdom of this decision, 48 we contend that the underlying 
purposes of a Code section cannot simply be constructed out of a series of 
drafts of texts considered in complete isolation from the deliberative process by 
which they were formulated and expressed. 
C. Pre-Code Law 
In the view we have been developing here, the meaning or purpose of any 
Code section can only be found if the drafters offer articulate and convincing 
reasons for their decisions. If pre-Code law establishes anything about the 
objectives of individual sections, it is that often it offers no rationally 
compelling ground for choosing one objective over another. That is, no 
historical vantage point suggests that one objective is more likely to be correct 
than another. In these cases, any reasonable approach may be adopted. 
The point becomes more vivid by examining the "basis of the bargain" 
requirement for an express warranty under section 2-313. Under the Uniform 
Sales Act, actual reliance by the buyer on a statement was a necessary element 
in a warranty case.49 Section 2-313 omits any reference to reliance, substituting 
N.Y. COMM'NREPoRT, supra note 4, at 163-64. 
47 The comments to the 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Unifonn 
Commercial Code state that "paragraph (3)(g) was deleted because the changes from the text 
enacted in Pennsylvania in 1953 are legitimate legislative history." Exactly what does this 
mean? "Is this intended to suggest that changes made prior to the 1952 edition adopted in 
Pennsylvania are not clearly legitimate legislative history? And to what extent should changes 
made by a drafting group, unconnected to the legislature, be considered as legitimate 
legislative history?" E. AlLEN FARNSWORTII ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
COMMERCIAL LAW 9-10 {5th ed. 1993). 
48 Some were undoubtedly glad to see paragraph (g) go. See 1956 NEW YoRK LAw 
REvisiON COMM'N STuDY OF TilE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 26. 
Although the Commission does not object to statement in the Code of rules of 
construction supplementary to the rules ordinarily applied to statutes (Section 1-102), it 
does not believe that courts and lawyers should be prevented or discouraged from using 
the many rules of interpretation ordinarily employed to determine meaning of text. 
Id. However, not all would agree that such a limitation on the freedom of judges to do what 
they might wish to do was such a bad idea. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, at 11 ("In 
our opinion they should have left it in."). 
49 An affirmation of fact or promise created an express warranty under the Unifonn 
Sales Act only "if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer to 
purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." Uniform Sales Act 
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the basis of the bargain language. so Was this substitution intended to avoid a 
requirement that the buyer show reliance in every breach of express warranty 
case?Sl The question is of both considerable theoretical interest and immense 
practical importance. If a buyer need not rely on the promise, affirmation, 
description, or model or sample to recover, section 2-313 will indeed have 
worked a revolution in the law. It is not our purpose here to suggest what the 
drafters intended. The nature of the case law can best be ascertained, however, 
by considering the following statement: 
It would be less than accurate to characterize the case law as manifesting a split 
of authority between those cases which insist upon a showing of reliance and 
those which reject that requirement. The confusion is much 
deeper .•.• [S]ome courts initially state that reliance is required, only to later 
suggest that in fact it is not or may not be required. Other courts initially state 
that reliance is not required, but proceed to suggest that it is required, either 
expressly or through some kind of inducement. Moreover, these cases may 
very well cite each other as authority. 52 
At least as a general rule, the confused state of the law on this issue argues 
powerfully in favor of the notion that in some cases, there is simply no answer 
to the interpretive question if it is posed as an inquiry into pre-Code law. In 
these circumstances, historical context is insufficient for decision. The 
resolution of the ambiguity calls for an inquiry into extra-textual statements by 
the drafters of both policy and principle. 53 
§ 12 (1906). 
SO Under section 2-313(1) express warranties can be created in several ways: (1) by an 
affirmation of fact or promise; (2) by a description of the goods; and (3) by a sample or model 
of the goods. Regardless of how the warranly is said to arise, no obligation is imposed on the 
seller unless the statement, description, or sample or model is "part of the basis of the 
bargain." U.C.C. § 2-313(1) (1995). 
51 What the drafters of the Code intended by the phrase "basis of the bargain" has been 
a source of perpetual confusion. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERs, supra note 38, at 491. 
The extent to which the law has so been changed is thoroughly WlClear. It is 
possible that the drafters did not intend to change the law, or that they intended to 
remove the reliance requirement in all but the most wmsual case, or that they intended 
simply to give the plaintiff the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of reliance. 
ld.; see also N.Y. CoMM'NREPoRr, supra note 4, at 393 ("'[B]asis of the bargain' does not 
convey a definite meaning."). 
52 John E. Murray, Jr., "Basis of the Bargain": Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 
MINN. L. REv. 283, 304 (1982). 
53 We think it vital to an intelligent interpretation of the basis of the bargain requirement 
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D. The Comments 
As previously discussed in Part IT, courts ought to be especially cautious in 
attributing too much weight to many of the standard sources of statutory 
meaning when they are seeking to detennine the underlying objectives of 
individual Code sections. Yet emphasis on the centrality of reasons and 
purposes to the application of Code text assumes that there be at least one 
appropriate place where the underlying objectives of individual sections can be 
articulated and expressed. Indeed, many of the criticisms we have leveled 
against the traditional sources of meaning would not apply to a direct statement 
of purpose by the drafters. 54 This suggests that there be an institutional device 
and practice to create opportunities for the drafters to state the reasons and 
arguments for their decisions. The most institutionalized example of this process 
is the "official comments" that follow each Code section. 55 
Even before the Code project began, Llewellyn recognized the practical 
necessity of statutory commentary. 56 For instance, while chairman of a 
that one consider the comments to § 2-313. Comment 3 states that "no particular reliance on 
[affirmations of fact] need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement." 
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1995). Comment 7 also argues against the need to prove reliance. It 
provides that "[t]he precise time when words of description or affirmation are made or 
samples are shown is not material .... If language is used after the closing of the deal •.. the 
warranty becomes a modification." U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 7 (1995). By recognizing the 
possibility that warranties can arise after the sale has been completed, this comment takes a 
position which is presumably inconsistent with the idea that a buyer is required to show some 
sort of reliance on the seller's statements. 
54 For an illuminating discussion, see McDonnell, supra note 36, at 830-41. McDonnell 
notes that "[b]ecause statements of purpose tend to be less abstract, they assist the interpreter 
with problems of ambiguity and vagueness that adhere in the Code text." Id. at 841. 
55 For a general overview of the format of the comments, see Robert H. Skilton, Some 
Comments on the Comments to the Unifonn Commercial Code, 1966 WIS. L. REv. 5CJ7, 606-
08. Professor Skilton points out that although the comments were referred to as "official 
comments" in the 1950 Draft, "[t]he adjective 'official' is not used in the present version to 
describe the comments, unless one takes the designation 'Official Text With Comments' to 
mean 'Official Text With Official Comments.'" ld. at 5CJ7 n.l. 
56 See, e.g., Sean Michael Hannaway, Note, The Jurispnulence and Judicial Treatment 
of the Comments to the Unifonn Commercial Code, 15 CoRNElL L. REv. 962, 963 (1990) 
[hereinafter U.C.C. Comments] (noting the great influence that Professor Williston's 
extensive commentacy on the Unifonn Sales Act had on courts and presumably, on Llewellyn 
and the drafters of the UCC); see also TwiNING, supra note 1, at 327 (explaining that the idea 
for Code comments had its genesis in Williston's commentary). Despite its appeal, Llewellyn 
was aware of the antidemocratic narure of extra-textual commentary. See REPoRr AND 
SECOND DRAFr: REvisED UNIFORM SALES Acr § 1A cmt. 2 {1941) {"[It is] no pleasant 
anomaly in a legal system which has not hitherto taken pleasure in the delegation to private 
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committee charged with amending the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, he 
declared: 
It is not enough that the law should be "clear," if it is not clear to those who 
decide cases. It is to be remembered that the Negotiable Instruments Law was 
accompanied by no such inclusive commentary as accompanied the Sales Act. 
Thanks to Williston's commentary on the latter, it was well nigh impossible for 
courts to seriously misconstrue the act; it was close to impossible to read one 
section without reference to other pertinent sections; indeed, even those 
portions of the act which in themselves were drafted with less adequacy had 
their inadequacy cured by the clear presentation in the commentary of their 
background and intent. 57 
To Llewellyn, what seemed to be crucial was that courts have ready access 
"to some reason and theory of purpose and organization" so that they would be 
better able to coherently account for Code text and context, and more general 
legal policies and principles implicated by the statute. 58 
It helps to appreciate some history here. Llewellyn's continuing 
appreciation of the importance of commentary again manifested itself in the 
Uniform Revised Sales Act, 59 and, later, in the early drafts of the Code. 60 The 
persons of essentially legislative power."). For more on the antidemocratic nature of the Code 
comments, see irifra notes 102-20 and accompanying text. 
57 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE lAWS, HANDBOOK 
OF TilE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND 
PROCEEDINGS 144, 145 (1933). 
58 Karl Llewellyn Papers, supra note 1, at 5. It is this principle that Llewellyn referred 
to as "the principle of the patent reason." Id. 
59 Section 1(2) of the 1944 Proposed Final Draft of the Unifonn Revised Sales Ad 
provided: "The [o]fficial [Joint] [c]omments of [the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws and] the American Law Institute may be consulted by the courts to 
determine the underlying reasons, purposes and policies of this Act and may be used as a 
guide in its construction and application." UNIFORM REv'D SALES Acr § 1(2) (Proposed Final 
Draft 1944). Interestingly, the comment to section 1 claimed for itself and its brethren a status 
beyond that oflegislative history. It read: 
Under [s]ubsection (2) the courts are expressly authorized to consult the [c]omments in 
interpreting and applying the principles of the Act. The [c]omments thereby acquire a 
status more than equivalent to that of a Committee Report on the basis of which a 
proposed bill has been enacted by the legislature. 
ld. § 1 cmt. 1. 
60 In the very first draft of the Code, Llewellyn included a provision that was almost a 
verbatim replication of section 1 of the Unifonn Sales Ad. See U.C.C. § 1-102(2) (May, 
1949). 
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1952 official version of the Code provided in section 1-102(3)(t) that "[t]he 
[c]omments of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws and the American Law Institute may be consulted in the construction and 
application of this Act but if text and comment conflict, text controls. "61 
Although this section was dropped from the Code in 1957, we learn that it was 
not because the comments were no longer perceived to be an integral part of 
the Code, but rather, because "the old comments were clearly out of date and it 
was not known when new ones could be prepared. "62 Since then, no reference 
to the comments has reappeared in the text. It would be a mistake to conclude, 
however, that their persuasive force has diminished. 
The theme that the comments continue to be an indispensable aid in 
determining the intent of the drafters is foreshadowed in the introductory 
comment to the Code: "To aid in uniform construction of this [c]omment and 
those which follow the text of each section set forth the purpose of various 
provisions of this Act to promote uniformity, to aid in viewing the Act as an 
integrated whole, and to safeguard against misconstruction [sic]. "63 It is one 
thing to recommend the use of the comments as an abstract principle; the real 
test of their influence is the extent to which courts have used them as the real 
61 u.c.c. § 1-102(3)(f) (1952). 
62 .AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1956 REcOMMENDATIONS OF TilE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR 
TIIE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 3 (1957). Alternatively, one may reasonably believe that 
the real reason why the drafters decided to eliminate the reference to the comments from the 
text was that they were eager to placate the influential New York Law Revision Commission. 
The Commission was openly hostile to section 1-102(3)(f). It believed that such a provision 
was "unnecessary and could lead to unprecedented use of the [c]omments to expand and 
qualify the text." NEW YORK STATE LAW REvisioN COMM'N, 1956 REPoRT OF TilE N.Y. 
STATE LAW REvisiON COMM'N 25 [hereinafter N.Y. LAW REvisiON COMM'N REPoRT]. 
63 U.C.C. § 1 (1995) (General Comment of the NCCUSL and the ALI). Moreover, the 
word "purposes" can be found in the heading of each comment In this vein, Professor 
Skilton listed several reasons why courts should pay particular attention to the comments: 
A particular reason for making use of the conunents is that they may be viewed as part 
of the legislative history of the Code. This view gives the conunents a special dignity. A 
more general reason is that they express opinions on meaning and purpose of text and 
were written by men who supposedly either participated in the drafting of the sections 
involved or were close to those who did. 
Skilton, supra note 50, at 602-03. For an article that depicts the comments as being the 
product of special interest groups and argues that, as such, they are not worthy of judicial 
deference, see Laurens Walker, Writings on the Margin of American Law: Committee Notes, 
Comments, and Commentary, 29 GA. L. REv. 993, 1007-15 (1995). While we agree with 
Professor Walker's ultimate conclusion, we do so for entirely different reasons. See infra 
notes 102-20 and accompanying text. 
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grounds of decision. 
For present purposes it will be useful to begin by distinguishing among the 
several sorts of functions served by the individual comments. All of them are 
pervasive. 
A comment may be (1) expository-seeking to descn"be the meaning and 
application of a section of the Code and its relationship with other sections, 
(2) gap-filling-seeking to suggest answers to questions not precisely covered 
by the text, or (3) promotional and argumentative-seeking to "sell" a 
controversial section. And so forth. The classifications are not mutually 
exclusive. 64 
Some functions are highly controversial, but they play an extremely 
prominent role in Code interpretation. To be sure, "[t]he courts take to the 
comments like ducks to water, even though the legislatures did not enact the 
comments. "65 
An example of the central idea here is former comment 3 to section 2-507. 
Section 2-507(2) gives a seller the right to reclaim goods from a cash buyer 
who has paid with a "rubber check. "66 But unlike section 2-702(2), which 
permits a seller to recover goods from a credit buyer who has received the 
goods while insolvent, section 2-507(2) is silent on the question of when the 
demand for reclamation must occur.67 Before it was amended in 1990, 
comment 3 to 2-507 contained an unexplained assertion: "The provision of this 
64 Skilton, supra note 55, at 608. 
65 WinTE & SUMMERs, supra note 34, at 12; see also Walker, supra note 63, at 1013 
("Courts have cited the comments thousands of times, often affording them great weight"); 
Note, U.C.C. Comments, supra note 56, at 975 ("In the great majority of cases, courts cite 
the [c]omments to support the application or purpose descn'bed in them."). 
66 Even though payment is by check, the trllmaction is comidered to be a cash sale. No 
credit is extended. See In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1976). In such 
cases, section 2-507(2) provides that "[w]here payment is due and demanded on the delivecy 
to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose 
of them is conditional upon his making the payment due." U.C.C. § 2-507(2) (1995). Under 
section 2-511(3), "payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the parties by 
dishonor of the check on due presentment" U.C.C. § 2-511(3) (1995). 
67 Section 2-702(2) provides in pertinent part: 
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he 
may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt, but if 
misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within 
three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply. 
u.c.c. § 2-702(2) (1995). 
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Article for a ten day limit within which the seller may reclaim goods delivered 
on credit to an insolvent buyer is also applicable here. "68 Relying on this 
comment, several courts have unhesitatingly imposed a ten day limit on 
reclamation applicable to cash sales. 69 
Here courts ought to be extremely cautious in attributing persuasive weight 
to the comment. Comment 3 is frankly designed to produce particular 
outcomes. By following this comment on a matter that does not appear in the 
statutory text, courts risk carrying out policies that cannot be tied to any 
legislative judgment. 70 The problem has arisen in many other cases where the 
comments seem designed to function more as legislation than merely as a 
means of discerning the meaning of statutory language. 71 
68 In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Unifonn Commercial Code amended 
comment 3 by deleting the reference to a ten day limitation and substituting in its place an 
explicit statement that "[t]here is no specific time limit for a cash seller to exercise the right of 
reclamation." PEB Commentary on the Uniform Commercial Code: Commentary No. 1, at 4 
(1990), reprinted in U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) (Findex/PEB Commentarties 1990). 
69 See, e.g., Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 630 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1980). The court held 
that the ten day limitation period contained in [c]omment 3 provides a more certain guide 
for conducting commercial transactions than the common law yardstick of 
"reasonableness," and that it will encourage cash sellers to make prompt presentment. 
Any extension of the ten day limitation period based on the realities of the commercial 
banking world is for the legislature, not for this Court. 
ld. at 4. Analytically, the court's opinion is unsatisfying. As Professor Walker notes: "[11he 
First Circuit announced the curious view that the comment merited weight and should only be 
changed by legislation, even though the comment itself had never been enacted." Walker, 
supra note 63, at 1015. Now that the PEB (a nonlegislative body) bas acted to change the 
comment one wonders whether the First Circuit would, if presented with the same issue 
today, reach a different conclusion. 
70 For example, the PEB commentary on 2-507(2) leaves little doubt that "[t]here is no 
justification for barring the cash seller's right or remedy of reclamation before discovery of 
non-payment." PEB Commentary, supra note 68, at 4. 
71 See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERs, supra note 34, at 13 ("[11he comments depart from 
the text in two different ways. They sometimes expand on, and therefore go beyond the text, 
and they sometimes restrict or narrow the meaning of the text."); Note, U.C.C. Comments, 
supra note 56, at 975-85 (discussing several instances where the "[c]omments [are] acting as 
Code"). The point is explicitly recognized by the New York Law Revision Commission in its 
criticism of the comments: 
A more serious objection arises from instances in which the [c]omments appear to 
qualify the text or to add further rules not supported by the text. (See, e.g., Comments 1, 
6, and 9 to Section 1-205, Comment 2 to Section 2-205, Comments 4, 8 and 13 to 
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What bearing does this observation have on the overall impact of the 
comments on commercial litigation? In the period before the Code, courts often 
departed from the literal meaning of commercial acts in cases in which 
literalism produced absurdity or irrationality. 72 Under the Code, similar 
departures should also be expected, but here the principle agent is the 
comments rather than the judiciary. Yet, the courts are most likely to be in a 
good position to know whether the application of a Code section, taken in the 
context of a dispute is in fact irrational or absurd. Whether or not this is a 
persuasive argument, most courts continue to follow the comments.73 
IV. THE CODE DRAFTING PROCESS 
Our inquiry now turns to the processes that determine the formulation of 
the UCC "black letter" and comments. An appreciation of the sponsoring 
organizations' methods informs construction of the finished product. First we 
focus on the text, the black letter, what we think of as the enacted law. Then we 
turn our attention to our primary focus, the drafting of the comments and the 
way in which those two drafting processes interact. We compare the Code 
comment drafting process with some analogous commentary drafting regimes 
and reveal certain fundamental incongruities. Those discoveries will support 
our critique of the courts' deference to the Code commentary. 
Recently, the UCC drafting and revision processes have been the subject of 
substantial commentary.74 The object of this Part of this Article is not to 
recount the terms of the discussion. Rather, our description of the process that 
Section 2-320, Comments 1 and 2 to Section 2-508, Comment 4 to Section 2-509, 
Comment 5 to Section 2-fiJJ, Comment 2 to Section 3-510, Comment 2 to Section 4-
212, Comment 9 to Section 4-403, Comments 1 and 4 to Section 7-501, Comment to 
Section 8-303, Comment 3 to Section 8-313, Comment 8 to Section 9-204, Comment 5 
to Section 9-318.). 
1956N.Y. LAWREv!siONCOMM'NREroKr, srqJranote62, at23. 
72 See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1995). 
73 Referring to the frequent disparity between Code text and comment, White and 
Summers note: "In some instances, the comments are sounder than the text, and in others, 
they are not. But disparity or no, most courts follow the comments." WHITE & SUMMERs, 
srqJra note 34, at 13. 
74 See, e.g., Peter A. Alces, Roll Over llewellyn?, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 543 (1993); 
Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Unifonn Laws Process: Some 
Lessons from the Unifonn Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REv. 83 (1993); Edward L. 
Rubin, Thinking like a Lawyer, Acting like a Lobbyist: Some Notes on the Process of 
Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 743 (1993); Robert E. Scott, 1he 
Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783 (1994). 
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produces the black letter of a new or revised article of the UCC is designed 
only to provide the basis to contrast the text drafting process from the process 
that determines the sum and substance of the comments. Only if the courts 
applying Code provisions appreciate the genesis of the comments will they be in 
a position to afford them due weight. Indeed, it would seem that legislatures, as 
well as individual state law reform committees and commissions, would better 
realize the ALI and NCCUSL objectives if they understand the contexts in 
which both black letter and comments are forged. 
A. Drafting the Black Letter 
Though the original Code may well have owed more to the insights of one 
man, Karl Llewellyn, than does any version of any subsequent reformulation of 
or addition to the Code, the primary responsibility for drafting the uniform 
commercial law, at least in the first instance, is in the control of a group, albeit 
a very small and discrete group. This group is not the Permanent Editorial 
Board for the UCC,75 though several of the members of the PEB exert 
considerable control over revision of the Code. 76 (That is not intended as a 
criticism, though some have expressed reservations about the status quo.77) And 
while procedures that govern the coordination of the various interests' revision 
of the Code are accessible to those who would peruse the documents and 
memoranda generated by the several constituencies, most of the decisions that 
matter are left to the judgment of the very capable principals. 78 
75 The PEB is the product of a joint venture between the NCCUSL and the AU. As of 
the date of publication, the members are Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. (Chair), Boris Auerbach, 
Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Gerald L. Bepko, Amelia H. Boss, Lawrence J. Bugge, William 
M. Burke, K. King Burnett, Ronald DeKoven, Bion M. Gregory, Frederick H. Miller, 
Donald J. Rapson, Curtis R. Reitz, and Carlyle C. Ring. 
76 For example, U.C.C. Revised Article 1, Drafting Committee Chair: Boris Auerbach, 
Members: Amelia H. Boss, Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Gerald L. Bepko, Curtis R. Reitz; 
UCC Revised Article 2A Leases: Reporter Marion W. Benfield, Jr., UCC Revised Article 
2B Licenses, Drafting Chair: Carlyle C. Ring, Member: Amelia H. Boss; UCC Revised 
Article 9 Secured Transactions, Sales of Accounts, Chattel Paper, and Payment Intangibles, 
Consignment, Chair: William M. Burke, Members: Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Donald J. 
Rapson. See The American Law Institute Annual Reports, 73 Annual Meeting 184, 191 (May 
1996). 
77 See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 
143 U. PA. L. REv. 595 (1995). 
78 The reporter is chosen by Professor Frederick Miller, Executive Director of the 
NCCUSL. The American Bar Association and AU representatives are chosen by their 
respective bodies. See Telephone Interview with John McCabe, Legislative Director/Legal 
Counsel for the NCCUSL (Aug. 8, 1996). The ABA and AU representatives are selected by 
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Once a suggestion is made that a particular Code project be undertaken by 
the sponsoring organizations, a study is conducted to see if the project would be 
worthwhile. The membership of the study group is diverse, at least in the 
commercial law sense. After some time studying the need for reform, the study 
group inevitably concludes that reform is necessary.79 There is, apparently, no 
glory in maintaining the status quo. 80 Once the sponsoring organizations resolve 
to go ahead with the reform project, a reporter is selected and the rest of the 
Drafting Committee is filled out. 81 Once the Drafting Committee is assembled, 
the reporter sets to work writing or rewriting the commercial law. The reporter 
is the primary (actually, for all intents and purposes the sole) drafter of the new 
or revised law. While there will be no shortage of people looking over his or 
her82 shoulder, in the first instance the reporter determines the form and 
substance of the black letter. Others react to what the reporter writes, but in no 
real way is it accurate to assume that the reporter merely reports the 
conclusions of others. 83 
The reporter's job is not an easy one, and the real compensation is in 
professional prestige rather than monetary form.84 Further, good reporters are 
hard to find. But once found, the reporter sets to drafting the law, though the 
first steps might be tentative. 85 The reporter will present the product of his 
labors to the Drafting Committee, both through preliminary meetings as well as 
through a full meeting of the Committee, which others interested in the project 
may and will attend. It is at such meetings that the reporter earns his money. 86 
The draft black letter, accompanied perhaps by some notes, prepared by 
the reporter, explaining the reasons supporting his formulation of a provision, 87 
individuals (Director of All, Chair of ABA's UCC Committee) within those groups perhaps 
with the input of some others, but are not identified through a formal selection process. Id. 
79 No study group has yet decided that revision is unnecessary. See Telephone Interview 
with John McCabe, supra note 78. 
80 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 77, at 610-15. 
81 See Lawrence J. Bugge, Commercial lAw, Federalism, and the Future, 17 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 11, 17 (1991) (citing HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 511 (1989)); Agreement, supra note 14, at 772-75 
[hereinafter Agreement]. 
82 Professor Soia Mentschikoff, wife of Karl Llewellyn, is, so far, the only woman to 
serve as a reporter on a UCC project Professors Mentschikoff and Llewellyn worked 
together on the original UCC project 
83 While the first draft is prepared solely by the reporter, subsequent drafts reflect the 
input of others. See Telephone Interview with John McCabe, supra note 78. 
84 See id.; see also Bugge, supra note 81, at 15. 
85 See Bugge, supra note 81, at 17. 
86 See id. at 15. 
87 See U.C.C. § 2-316 notes (Discussion Draft for 1996 Ammal Meeting of NCCUSL 
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or posing questions for the Drafting Committee and others to consider,ss is sent 
to the members of the Drafting Committee and other interested observers89 for 
their review prior to the meeting of the Drafting Committee and reporter. At 
this stage, any "notes" appended to particular provisions are not likely to be 
"draft" comments, though it may be that the reporter will draw on those notes 
when the time comes to write the comments.90 
The reporter will generally send with the draft a cover memorandum 
describing the status quo of the project, as well as, perhaps, drawing the 
readers' attention to matters of particular concem.91 But when the meeting 
begins, and each meeting lasts about two and one half days, 92 it takes a talented 
chair and focused reporter to maintain the forward progress of the 
dehberations. There are some "hot" issues,93 for which particular interests are 
lying in wait, 94 and there are some matters that barely warrant any mention 
July 1996) ("At the 1995 Annual Meeting of the NCCUSL, the [commissioners] voted to 
delete the bracketed language in subsection (e). It has been restored with some modifications 
for further discussion."). 
88 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-709 notes (Discussion Draft for 1996 Annual Meeting of 
NCCUSL July 1996) ("There is no comparable provision in the Convention [on the 
International Sale of Goods]. Is Section 2-709 [sic] a rule of validity within Article 4(a)? If so, 
should Article 2 say so?"). 
89 The NCCUSL will distribute copies of drafts and pertinent memoranda and 
correspondence upon the request of interested parties. 
90 Some of the notes included within discussion drafts read like comments. See, e.g., 
U.C.C. § 2-318, note 2 (Discussion Draft for 1996 Annual Meeting ofNCCUSL July 1996): 
Section 2-318 deals with warranty claims by a buyer or lessee ... against "the seller" 
with whom there is no privity of contract. See Section 2-313(a) for the definitions. The 
remote buyer may be a commercial or a consumer buyer who claims economic loss, 
including damage to goods sold, but not injury to person or property other than the 
goods sold. See Section 2-319. The section also deals with "remote" lessees. 
91 See, e.g., Memorandum from Richard E. Speidel, Reporter to Article 2 Drafting 
Committee (Jan. 4, 1995). Similar memoranda may be distributed prior to the annual 
NCCUSL meetings. See, e.g., Richard E. Speidel, Article 2, Sales, Progress Report to 
NCCUSL, July, 1996 Draft (on file with authors). 
92 Most of the work of the Committee is accomplished during the first two days of the 
meeting. Given the participants' travel schedules, the morning of the third day, generally a 
Sunday morning, is abbreviated. 
93 Such issues include, but are not limited to, innovations posited by the revision, such as 
abolition of the section 2-201 writing requirement in Revised Article 2, and adjustment of the 
filing system in Article 9. 
94 Consumer representatives have become more active in the UCC drafting and revisions 
processes and, therefore, large institutional providers of goods and services to consumers are 
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whatsoever. 95 
It is difficult to gauge the level of preparation of the members of the 
Drafting Committee and observers prior to the meeting. There are some who 
have perused the draft with great care, and there are others who attend more to 
take notes and report back to their constituencies than to influence the 
formulation of any particular section. Some of the members of the Drafting 
Committee and observers are expert in the specific commercial law issues on 
the table; others are more novice. There are no substantive admissions criteria, 
but the cost of attending certainly may have an impact on the composition of the 
group in attendance.% 
The tenor of the discussion/debate will depend on the stage of the drafting 
process: the earlier along, the less specific the language choices must be. There 
will be discussions of principle as well as syntax and vocabulary. But through 
the course of the several meetings, the black letter of the statute emerges. There 
is compromise, but some belligerence too. The black letter is picked at and 
prodded until the Drafting Committee is satisfied with it, or until the Committee 
decides it needs the reporter to go back and do some more work. 
Once a year during the drafting process, the draft is "read" before the 
annual meeting of the NCCUSL.97 The draft is actually read, word by word, 
and, depending on the reader, punctuation may not be omitted. The process is 
tedious but very effective. While it is probably the case that most of the 
commissioners in attendance who are interested in the commercial law have 
read the draft with some care prior to the meeting, actually reading the draft at 
the meeting assures that the discussion stays focused and that nothing is 
overlooked. All that is read, however, is the black letter. Though reference 
may be made to notes appended by the reporter to particular sections, there is 
no official reading of the commentary. It has likely not yet been drafted. 
At several junctures during the course of the reading, individual 
commissioners will rise to ask questions of the reporter or Drafting Committee 
increasingly poised to defend the status quo. For example, in the Article 2 process, the 
advertising industry and consumer representatives have "faced off" on issues concerning the 
scope and operation of the express warranty rules. For the tenor of the advertising industry's 
reaction to proconsumer initiatives, see Memorandum from Advertising Group to NCCUSL 
{July 2, 1996), and Memorandum from NIMA Int'l to NCCUSL (July 3, 1996) (both on file 
with authors). 
95 For example, abrogation of the role of "seals" in sales transaction (U.C.C. § 2-203) 
consistently fails to generate heated debate. 
96 To its great credit, the NCCUSL has endeavored to increase the level of consumer 
interest participation. See Fred H. Miller, Conswner Issues and the Revision of U.C.C. 
Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1565, 1573 (1994). 
97 See Bugge, supra note 81, at 17. 
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members, or will criticize a formulation of the black letter or ask for a vote on 
a matter of policy. If there are votes, they are voice votes: the loudest side 
prevails, which may mean whichever side votes last and has the opportunity to 
adjust decibel level accordingly. 98 While observers who pay the fee to attend 
the meeting can listen to the commissioners' deliberations and can approach 
individual commissioners to urge them to raise a point on the floor, 
noncommissioners generally do not have "floor privileges. "99 
By the time the black letter has been read the requisite number of times at 
the annual meeting, 100 it is polished. That does not mean it is perfect, 101 but 
there will not be any formulation or conception in the black letter that the 
commissioners (and others at Drafting Committee meetings) will not have had 
several opportunities to review. The NCCUSL does a very effective job of 
maintaining the openness of its process, at least so far as public debate is 
concerned. That candor is in the interest of NCCUSL, because once the 
Conference promulgates a uniform act, its work has only begun. It must then 
"sell" the act to the state legislatures, as close to intact, read "uniform," as 
possible. 
98 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE lAWS, 
STATEMENT OF POUCY ESTABUSHING CRrrERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DESIGNATION AND 
CONSIDERATION OF Acrs 431 (1986). Floor votes are usually one-person-one-vote. However, 
any commissioner may call for a vote by states on any issue. The final approval of an Act is 
by state. See id. 
Mr. McCabe explains that within the drafting committees an oral vote is used, due 
primarily to the small number of participants. At the annual meeting, business is conducted by 
a committee of the whole. Motions can be raised from the floor on any matter, so long as the 
movant is a commissioner. The chairman of the committee of the whole will from time to 
time, in the interest of keeping things moving, call for additional motions. The votes on these 
motions are generally voice votes. A commissioner can call for a count, which is done simply 
by counting those standing and those sitting. Any commissioner can also call for a state-by-
state vote, where each state gets only one vote. Written votes are not taken. See Telephone 
Interview with John McCabe, supra note 78. 
99 Representatives of the ABA and the AU, even when not members of the Drafting 
Committee, may be granted floor privileges: the opportunity to speak before the annual 
meeting with regard to issues raised by the draft being read. 
100 The NCCUSL rule is that each Act must be read two times before it can be 
promulgated by the commissioners. Though projects may, and often do, continue for three or 
more years, and therefore are read three or more times at the annual meeting. See Telephone 
Interview with John McCabe, supra note 78. 
101 For example, Article 2A-Leases, as originally promulgated by the NCCUSL in 
1987 contained deficiencies discovered by several commentators in a symposium issue of the 
Alabama Law Review. See Symposium, Article 2A of the Unifonn Commercial Code, 39 
AlA. L. REv. 559 (1988). As a result, the commissioners promulgated uniform amendments 
of Article 2A, which resulted in a revised uniform text. 
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B. The Formulation of the Comments 
To compare the genesis of the official conunents with that of the black 
letter (to the extent that such a comparison is accessible), it is necessary to 
pursue a tripartite inquiry, first, focusing on the treatment of the comments 
during the process of drafting the black letter, second, descnbing the work of 
the reporter on the conunents after the black letter has been approved by the 
sponsoring organizations, and third, contrasting the treatment of the 
development and promulgation of UCC comments with other bodies of official 
conunentary pertinent to the construction of conunercial law. This portion of 
our investigation will reveal that courts may afford deference to the comments 
that is inappropriate given their dubious foundation in the drafting process. 
1. Consideration of the Comments During the Code Drafting Process 
As described in the preceding section of this Article, the focus of the 
Drafting Committee meetings is on the black letter of the conunercial law. 
There is no systematic consideration given to conunentary, official or 
otherwise, for (at least) two reasons: The comments have not been drafted at 
the time the Drafting Committee and observers consider the black letter at the 
several two and one-half day meetings held to work on the draft, and, perhaps 
most crucially, the sponsoring organizations never review the comments when 
voting to promulgate the new or revised unifonn law .102 So not only is there no 
opportunity for the Drafting Committee and observers to review the 
commentary, but there would be nothing at stake, so far as AU and NCCUSL 
approval is concerned, were the group assembled to review the draft disposed 
to include a careful perusal of the comments along with the black letter.103 
That is not to say thatthe group assembled at Drafting Committee meetings 
is ignorant of the role and importance of the conunents. It is not the least bit 
unusual for those commenting on the black letter to raise a reservation with 
particular language, but then to agree that any unfortunate construction of the 
language could be avoided by a comment explaining the limits of the black 
letter's logic.104 And the issues that are relegated to "clarification" in the 
102 See N.Y. CoMM'N REPoRT, supra note 4, at 64 ("[I]t should be noted that a full 
explanation of the 'reasons' for a provision might well, if submitted for 'approval,' arouse 
more controversy and take longer to get an agreement on, than would the text itself." (quoting 
Professor Edwin Patterson) (footnotes omitted)). 
103 See Skilton, supra note 55, at 603 n.l7 (noting that although proposed comments go 
through an approval process before publication, this process is different than that used for 
textual changes to the UCC and thus should not be afforded weight as legislative history). 
104 With regard to the fit between a Revised Article 2 and the new Restatement of 
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comments may not be insignificant.105 
Even when someone suggests that the reporter clarify the operation of the 
black letter with a comment, and the reporter agrees to do so, 105 there may well 
never be an opportunity to follow that up, because, recall, the comments are 
not reviewed along with the black letter at the votes to promulgate. In fact, 
none of the comments will likely be available to interested groups and observers 
or to the members of the Drafting Committee until the black letter is approved. 
2. The Reporter's Work on the Comments 
The official comments to the Uniform Commercial Code are the work, 
primarily if not exclusively, of one person: the reporter.107 Of course, there is 
probably no better single person to do the work, given the selection process that 
identified the reporter and the fact that the black letter is primarily the work of 
that reporter.108 It is not at all clear, however, that it makes much sense to trust 
Products liability, the Director of the ALI, Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., proposed 
alternative means of accommodating, making consistent, the two projects, both of which are 
sponsored by the ALI. Professor Hazard proposed that a comment be included with the black 
letter to make clear that "[a] claim that the goods are non-merchantable in breach of the 
warranty defined in [s]ection 2-314 is governed by the substantive products liability law 
defining product defect. Goods not defective under products liability law may nevertheless be 
found to be in breach of the warranty defined in [s]ection 2-313 or in [s]ection 2-315. [The 
first sentence of this comment would also be included in the comment to section 2-314.]" 
Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director, ALI, to UCC Article 2 Drafting Committee 
(Jan. 22, 1996). 
105 See id.; see also Northern Ind. Pub. Ser. Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co., 799 F.2d 
265, 277 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.). Judge Posner ruled that the official comments to section 
2-615 ("Commercial Impracticability") did not operate to protect the buyer because Indiana 
had not adopted the official comments. Application of the official comment would have 
extended the black letter to afford buyers the benefit of the impracticability defense; see 
WHITE & SUMMERs, supra note 42, at 13 ("When opponents of a draft section prevailed 
against the draftsman, the draftsman would sometimes revise the draft accordingly, but seek 
to preserve the old draft in the footnotes."). 
106 One commentator has labelled this by-product a "'negotiated comment' -that is, a 
case where after the text has been agreed upon, a still troublesome point is negotiated by 
securing amendment of the comment, in order to get concurrence." See Skilton, supra note 
55, at 618 n.39. 
107 "The practice in recent years has been for the [r]eporter {i.e., principal drafter) to 
draft [o]fficial [c]omments after the sponsors have approved the text. These [c]omments are 
subject only to the approval of the chair of the [D]rafting [C]ommittee." E. Au.EN 
FARNSWORTII, ET AL., supra note 47, at 11. 
108 See Walker, supra note 63, at 1000 n.40. As Attorney General William Mitchell 
ably stated: "Furthermore, I think it was Lord Bacon who said that a person who drafted a 
HeinOnline -- 58 Ohio St. L.J. 449 1997-1998
1997] COMMENIING ON "PURPOSE» 449 
the work of officially commenting on the uniform law to one person, or, even 
were it sensible to afford such deference, to then insulate that commentary from 
the type of careful procedure that assured the integrity of the black letter. 
To understand the role of the comments, it is worthwhile to appreciate the 
design and object of the official commentary. The reporter may use the 
comments to put the black letter in perspective, 109 to describe the considerations 
that informed the balance struck by the black letter,110 and even to restate the 
black letter in more accessible terms.111 It would certainly be illegitimate for 
the comments to expand on the law-to offer a construction of the black letter 
that goes beyond the terms of the particular provision. And it would not be 
likely that the reporter would try to undermine his product by surreptitiously 
amending the black letter in the commentary. 
Insofar as courts look to, or are directed to, the comments when the black 
letter is not dispositive, it is clear that the comments may fill the interstices of 
the law in ways that go beyond the black letter, even if that was not the 
reporter's design.112 The danger of that use of official commentary was 
recognized by the NCCUSL in the Second Draft of the Revised Unifonn Sales 
Act, dated 1941: 
document was least qualified to interpret it, because he always had in mind what he intended 
to say rather than what he acttJally said." I d. 
109 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2A-304 cmt. 1 (1995) ("This section must be read in 
conjunction with, as it is subject to, the provisions of [s]ection 2A-303, which govern 
voluntary and involuntary transfers of rights and duties under a lease contract, including the 
lessor's residual interest in the goods."). 
110 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (1995) ("rrJhe section [2-318] in this form 
[Alternative C] is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on 
whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the 
distributive chain."). 
111 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-'lJJl cmt. 3 (1995): 
Whether or not additional or different tenns will become part of the agreement depends 
upon the provisions of subsection (2). If they are such as materially to alter the original 
bargain, they will not be included tmless expressly agreed to by the other party. If, 
however, they are tenns which would not so change the bargain they will be 
incorporated tmless notice of objection to them has already been given or is given within 
a reasonable time. 
112 Also, courts have relied on the comments before the particular version of the text had 
been adopted by the relevant state. See, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Old 
Colony Trust Co., 417 N.E.2d 471, 474-75 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981), ajJ'd, 429 N.E.2d 1143 
(Mass. 1982); In re Doughboy Indus. Inc., 233 N.Y.S.2d 488, 495-96 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1962). . 
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[T]here is no clear room in our doctrinal scheme of statutory construction for 
legislative intent to be found with clarity and precision in the acts or 
declarations of persons who have no official connection with the actual passage 
of the legislation. This makes use of the [c]omments of the [NCCUSL] 
anomalous.113 
That excerpt reminds us that the reporter, though anointed by the All and 
NCCUSL, has not been elected to write the law and has no legislative authority 
beyond the states' enactment of the black letter that has been the subject of the 
careful deliberations of the members of the All and the NCCUSL in addition 
to all of the other interested constituencies whose participation in the drafting 
process may have had an impact on the black letter. The sponsoring 
organizations do not approve the comments. 
In fairness, it is necessary to acknowledge that the comments, though 
drafted by the reporter and not subject to the careful scrutiny reserved for the 
black letter, may well reflect the conclusions of persons other than the reporter, 
in at least a few different ways. 
First, the reporter essentially may be writing the comments throughout the 
course of the black letter drafting process. Quite often at the Drafting 
Committee meetings as well as in the reporter's meeting with members of the 
All114 and during the annual readings before the NCCUSL individuals or 
groups of individuals suggest that a conception captured in the black letter can 
be clarified in the comments. And the reporter may be admonished to offer 
such a clarification in the comments when he writes them. Presumably, 
someone keeps careful enough notes to know whether the final product actually 
contains the appropriate commentary .115 
Second, the reporter may, and probably usually does, seek the advice of 
others with either particular expertise in the subject matter of the commentary 
or particular concern about the pertinent black letter. In that way, the reporter 
assures that the comment will be responsive to the specific context in which the 
black letter will operate. But there is no published requirement that the reporter 
seek such counsel or that the reporter defer to the judgment of others in drafting 
the comment. Indeed, even were an individual or constituency troubled by the 
language in a comment, there would not be a setting, short of the individual 
state legislatures, in which objection to the comment could have an impact on 
113 UNIFORM REv'D SALES Acr § 1-A cmt. 2 (Report & Second Draft 1941). 
114 During the course of a drafting project, the reporter will meet with the members of 
the AU Council, the Member's Consultative Group, and, at the annual meetings, with the 
general membership of the AU .. 
115 The Annual Proceedings of the AU will contain a transcript of comments made at 
the annual meeting, and a tape recording of the comments of the other meetings are made 
available to the reporter, who may well take notes of his own during any of the meetings. 
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the promulgation of the uniform law. 
Also, occasionally, third parties might be invited to contribute to the 
drafting of a comment if they have devoted particular attention to a topic treated 
in the black letter and identified an ambiguity in the black letter that the 
comment could resolve. Given the timing of the drafting process, this would 
likely not be a common practice, but it does suggest a means to augment the 
comment drafting process. 
Fourth, commentary from prior versions of the Code may be incorporated 
into the new uniform law if practice has demonstrated that particular 
commentary has been worthwhile. 'This means of enhancing the authority of the 
commentary is most viable when the uniform law is being revised rather than 
drafted for the first time. Even in the case of new uniform law, such as UCC 
Articles 2A and 2B, there is sufficient common ground with existing uniform 
commercial law, i.e., Articles 2 and 9, to support the incorporation of 
commentary from analogous contexts into the new formulations. Yet the 
problem remains that in the choice of what and how much of the old to 
incorporate into the new, the reporter's choices are unchecked, but at least the 
commentary would have been carried forward because it has stood a test of 
time. Presumably, had it done more harm than good, the black letter would 
have been cleaned up to avoid any confusion caused. 
Fifth, the individual state bodies that review NCCUSL products prior to 
their being introduced in the state legislatures will have both the black letter and 
the official comments before them in determining the form that the uniform law 
should take in their particular state. In some states, there are law revision 
commissions established to review and prepare legislation prior to its 
introduction in the state legislature.116 While it is difficult to generalize about 
the form and function of these commissions, some observations about a not 
atypical process, the Alabama model, gives a sense of the role these review 
panels may serve in the uniform commercial law movement with regard to both 
the black letter and the official commentary .111 
After the NCCUSL promulgated Article 2A of the UCC, "Leases," the 
Director of the Alabama Law Institute, Robert McCurley, empaneled a 
committee of commercial attomeys118 to determine whether the uniform law 
should be proposed to the Alabama legislature by the Alabama Law Institute. 
116 This is the case, for example, in New York and Alabama. 
117 Professor Peter Alces was the Alabama Reporter for Article 2A, and the 
observations in this portion of the essay are based on his work on that project 
118 The members of the Alabama committee were J. Robert Fleenor, Chair, Douglas T. 
Arendall, H. Hampton Boles, Andrew P. Campbell, Ralph Franco, John B. Givhan, William 
Hairston, Neil Johnston, Jim Klinefelter, Barry S. Marks, Elbert H. Parsons, Jr., Joseph 
Stewart, and Mike Waters. 
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One of the authors of this Article was appointed by Mr. McCurley to work with 
the Alabama Committee as an Alabama State Reporter to review Article 2A, 
section by section and official comment by official comment. The members of 
the Alabama Committee reconsidered every policy and language choice made 
by the Committee that had drafted the uniform version of Article 2A, and 
where the Alabama Committee deemed necessary, made changes both to 
conform the uniform law to the existing Alabama commercial law, and to 
improve upon the product of the ALI and NCCUSL in instances where the 
Alabama Committee believed it could improve upon the uniform law. 
While every deference was afforded the uniform law, the Alabama 
Committee was very active in its review of Article 2A. Even though very few 
portions of the uniform law were adjusted at all, the members of the Alabama 
Committee realized that when the proposed statute was introduced to the state 
legislature, it might be necessary to defend all of the choices made by the 
uniform law. h1 the course of this review, the official comments were read 
closely with the black letter and were subject to adjustment119 if the 
commentary went beyond or simply did not fit the black letter. Additionally, as 
part of the Alabama Committee's review process, the Alabama Reporter 
drafted Alabama commentary which was included with the uniform black letter 
and official commentary in the finallegislation.12o The Alabama commentary 
was reviewed by the members of the Alabama Committee before the legislation 
was introduced in the state legislature. 
h1 the case of states such as Alabama, then, which systematically peruse 
both the black letter and official commentary with great care before the uniform 
law is introduced in the state legislature, there is an independent check on the 
uniform law reporter's official comments before the legislature acts on those 
comments. But still the problem remains that the legislature, as such, never 
really participates in the development of this form of "legislative history." The 
work is done by an unelected committee and often reflects the conclusions of no 
one other than the reporter. The members of any review committee could not 
possibly anticipate the contexts in which particular official commentary might 
be pertinent to construction of the statute and so may well not appreciate the 
consequences of the reporter's conclusion. 
While there are some checks, then, on the reporter's discretion and 
judgment in formulating the comments, often the source of the courts' 
identification of the purpose of the black letter, the checks are far from perfect 
given the weight that the courts may afford the comments. 
119 See, e.g., ALA. CODE§§ 7-2A-406, -506 (1993). 
120 See, e.g., id. 
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3. The Comments Compared with Other Forms of Official Commentary 
Notwithstanding the curious nature of "legislative history" that takes the 
form of comments promulgated by those who are not legislators, there seems to 
be an irresistible impulse on the part of the uniform law drafters to share with 
those who would apply the law the drafters' sense of how the law should be 
applied. That is probably because there is something inevitable about purposive 
interpretation. So long as judges construe statutes, they will not be inconsiderate 
of the statute's purpose, and so long as purpose matters, it will be difficult for 
judges to ignore the drafters' statements of purpose. 
To fix the proper role of the comments it is worthwhile to acknowledge 
analogous forms of commentary, that provided by drafters as well as by third 
parties with at least as good a sense of the commercial dynamic and the black 
letter's reaction to it. Two analogous forms of commentary warrant attention: 
the reporter's notes and comments to Restatements of the Law-the products of 
the AU-and the UCC commentary published by the PEB of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. Both may provide useful models for emulation in future 
UCC revision and drafting processes. 
a. Commentary to the Restatements of the Law 
The Restatements of the Law endeavor to formulate the evolved principles 
in more or less discrete areas of the law in order to provide guidance to courts 
applying those principles in recurring transactions. That may be an over-
simplification, but it suffices to descn"be the object of the AU when it 
promulgates the Restatements. Of course, the Restatements are not enacted law 
in any state, though they may reflect the statutory formulations that are enacted 
law in the states. Existing statutes121 as well as common law rules122 may 
provide the substance of the Restatement provisions. 
An area of the law may well be treated in an AU Restatement rather than 
an ALIINCCUSL article of the UCC because there are simply not sufficient 
funds in the NCCUSL's budget to support another UCC revision effort. To 
some extent, that would explain why, in the first instance, the Restatement of 
Suretyship and Guaranty was not promulgated as a new Article 3A of the 
UCC. So the difference between a Restatement of an area of the law and a 
codification of an area of the law may be more a matter of finances than 
121 See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SliRErYSIDP & GUARANTY § 1 cmts. b, c, 
(1996) (describing state statutory law's impact on the Restatement). 
122 See id. § 1 cmts. b, e, f, h, k, I, n, & § 4 cmt. c (describing effect of common law 
on Restatement). 
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jurisprudence.123 Indeed, while early Restatements did not have the same 
texture as statutes, 124 the more recent· Restatements look a good deal like 
statutes.125 
The extent, then, that an area of law is "restated" rather than "codified" in 
the UCC, may well intimate nothing about the reasons for the project or the 
composition of the final product. There is no jurisprudential reason (or political 
reason, for that matter) that the commentary accompanying the Restatements 
should differ substantially from the commentary accompanying revisions of the 
UCC. But there are, indeed, substantial differences; the UCC comments do not 
compare favorably. 
As drafts of new Restatements are prepared by the reporter, the advisors 
(akin to the UCC Drafting Committee) review both the black letter as well as 
the reporter's notes126 and the proposed comments. The advisors may offer 
suggestions on the drafting of the comments and on the relationship between the 
black letter and commentary. The comments are drafted as the black letter is 
drafted and each level of ALI review contemplates review of both elements of 
the Restatement. 
It is not immediately clear why a similar procedure could not inform the 
UCC revision process. Indeed, insofar as the ALI is a co-sponsor of the Code, 
it is not clear why the ALI does not currently require that the UCC revisions 
follow the same process as the Restatements. This could be, and we suggest, 
should be, treated explicitly in the agreement between the AU and NCCUSL 
with respect to the Uniform Commercial Code.127 Certainly the members of the 
ALI should insist upon this, and it is not clear why or even if the NCCUSL 
would resist. 
b. Permanent Editorial Board Commentary to the Code 
The UCC is organic, by which we mean no less than that it is as close to a 
123 The sponsoring organizations may have access to different pools of funds depending 
upon whether the product under study is to be a restatement or a model law. See Telephone 
Interview with John McCabe, supra note 78. 
124 The earlier Restatements often read as statements of principle rather than as statutes. 
See, e.g., REsTATEMENr (SEcOND) OF CONTRAcrs § 90 (1981); REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF 
TORTS § 261 (1965). 
125 See, e.g., REsTATEMENr (THIRD) OF SUREIYSHIP & GUARANTY §§ 37, 49, 62 
(1996). 
126 These reporter's notes describe the research base supporting the reporter's 
formulation of a provision or comment. See, e.g., REsTATEMENr (TmRD) OF SUREIYSHIP & 
GUARANTY § 38A, Reporter's Introductocy Note (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1995). 
127 q. Agreement, supra note 81, § B(S) (concerning the composition and function of 
thePEB). 
HeinOnline -- 58 Ohio St. L.J. 455 1997-1998
1997] COMMENI'ING ON "PURPOSE" 455 
living, breathing, reacting thing as a statute can be. Karl Llewellyn and Grant 
Gilmore, as well as the other midwives present at the Code's creation, 
recognized that the Code could only work so long as it reflected and supported 
better commercial practices, however such practices should evolve.128 Because 
the UCC is state law, enacted separately in the several states, adjustment of 
Code provisions in response to fluctuations in the commercial breeze are not 
possible. The Code was drafted in flexible tenns, sufficient to provide the triers 
of fact and law the means to effect the immanent justice of a situation.129 
In light of that fixed but necessarily fluid character of the Code, it is not 
surprising that the AU and NCCUSL created a Permanent Editorial Board to 
monitor the Code and the commercial law to assure that the objects of the UCC 
are not frustrated: 
It sball be the function of the PEB to discourage amendments or additions to 
the Uniform Commercial Code not authorized pursuant to [the agreement 
between the ALI and NCCUSL], to assist in attaining and maintaining 
uniformity in state statutes governing commercial transactions, and to monitor 
the law of commercial transactions for needed modernization or other 
improvement.130 
The PEB, composed of leading commercial authorities, 131 is authorized by 
the ALIINCCUSL agreement to "prepar[e] and publish[] supplemental 
[c]omments or Annotations to the Uniform Commercial Code and other 
articulations as appropriate to reflect the correct interpretation of the Code and 
issu[e] the same in a manner and at times best calculated to advance the 
uniformity and orderly development of commercial law .... "132 The PEB, 
pursuant to that directive, subsequently adopted a "Resolution on Purposes, 
Standards and Procedures for PEB Commentary to the UCC," which provides 
a deh"berate and conscientious process by which the commentaries would be 
128 For a discussion of "Code Jurisprudence," see Peter A. Alces, A Jurisprudential 
Perspective for the True Codification of Payments Law, 53 FORDHAML. REv. 83 (1984). 
129 Karl Llewellyn thought of this process as involving "situation sense," a term that has 
caused some debate among commentators attempting to define it It refers to "true 
understanding" of facts and "right evaluation" by judges who are experienced in life and 
possess a general sense of equity. See TwiNING, supra note 1, at 216-17. A judge applying 
situation sense would have experience and a grasp of the usage and ethics of the commercial 
trade, as well as of the manner in which the transaction in question generally was conducted, 
in order to determine the solution to the problem most reasonable and acceptable to the 
commercial community. See id. at 225. 
130 Agreement, supra note 14, § B(S). 
131 See id. § B(1). 
132 Id. § B(S)(b). 
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developed. To emphasize the care with which the commentaries are prepared it 
is appropriate to reproduce the pertinent portion of the enabling resolution: 
The process by which PEB Commentary is prepared and issued by the 
PEB should be flexible, but usually should include: 
a. periodic publication of the topics under consideration by the PEB with a 
request for comment by interested persons by a stated date as to whether any 
listed topic should be deleted or a related topic added and as to the appropriate 
resolution of the issues presented by the topics under consideration; 
b. selection of one or more appropriate advisers, who are not members of the 
PEB, to review any comments submitted by interested persons and other 
relevant materials and to prepare a tentative adviser's draft of the proposed 
PEB Commentary; 
c. publication of the adviser's draft of the PEB CommenJary, after supervisocy 
review of the PEB, soliciting comments by interested persons by a stated date 
on the substance and style of the work; 
d. approval by the PEB of the substance and style of the PEB Commentary as 
finally submitted by the· adviser(s) and comments submitted by interested 
persons or, when warranted, the withdrawal of the proposal with the reasons 
for withdrawal stated; and 
e. periodic publication of such PEB Commentary as is approved by the PEB on 
a regular schedule.133 
The AU and NCCUSL, then, clearly contemplate a role for official 
commentary and recognize the importance of developing that commentary in a 
manner that assures full consideration of the issues. In fact, the procedure 
descnbed in the foregoing excerpt would seem to guarantee the same care in 
drafting PEB commentary that attends the UCC black letter drafting process. It 
is curious that the PEB commentaries, which are not a part of the enacted law 
in any jurisdiction, are drafted with more AU/NCCUSL attention, and much 
broader participation, than are the UCC comments, which are enacted with the 
black letter in a significant number of states134 and which are afforded law-like 
133 Permanent Editorial Board, Resolution on Purposes, Standards and Procedures for 
PEB Commentary to the UCC § 2 (Mar. 14, 1987) (reproduced in the 1994 edition of the 
UCC). 
134 States that enact the comments along with the black letter include Alabama, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Mazyland, 
Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
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deference by the courts. Similarly, the comments and reporter's notes to the 
Restatements are drafted with substantially more opportunity for review and 
participation than are the UCC comments; and the Restatement commentary, of 
course, is not the enacted law in any jurisdiction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Statutory ambiguity is common. In the face of ambiguity, outcomes must 
turn on interpretive principles of various sorts; there is simply no other way to 
decide hard cases. Karl Llewellyn, who saw the traditional canons of 
constructions as vacuous and self-contradictory,135 contended that courts should 
follow the practice of construing language in light of purpose.136 His view that 
the Code and a technical type of construction are incompatlble can be found in 
the expression of underlying purposes and policies contained in section 1-102 
and the emphasis in the comments that "the text of each section should be read 
in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in 
question .... "137 On this view, purposive interpretation also serves as a crucial 
mechanism for keeping the Code current by permitting courts to respond to 
changing conditions and mores.138 
To say this is not to say, however, that the Code's purpose and policies will 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West 
Virginia, and WtsCOmin. See U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) (State U.C.C. Variatiom Binder 
1996). 
Some courts seem to have assumed that the comments were actually approved by the 
NCCUSL and the AU and represent the opinion of these bodies. See, e.g., In re Rivet, 299 
F. Supp 374 (E.D. Mich. 1969); In re Anthony, 835 P.2d 811 (N.M. 1992). This assumption 
is unsound, however, as a review of UCC history fails to show a single state which has 
adopted the comments in the sense that they have been made part of the legislation. See 
Wilkerson Motor Co. v. Johmon, 580 P.2d 505, 508-09 (Okla. 1978); Burchett v. Allied 
CoiK:Ord Fin. Corp., 396 P.2d 186, 190 (N.M. 1964); see also JOHN HONNOlD, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON THE LAw OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING 12-13 (5th ed. 1984) ("The most 
obvious point about the [c]omments is the one which •.• is most often overlooked: The text 
to the Code [is] enacted by the legislamre; the [c]omments [a]re not"). yet, some courts have 
referred to the comments as being "adopted," see Consolidated Film Indus. v. United States, 
547 F.2d 533, 537 (lOth Cir. 1977), and the U.C.C. Reporting Service indicates that the 
comments have been "adopted" in some states. See U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (CBC) (State U.C.C. 
Variatiom Binder 1996). 
135 See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Carwns About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 V AND. L. REv. 395, 399400 (1950). 
136 See Karl Llewellyn Papers, supra note 1 and accompanying text 
137 See U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt 1 (1985). 
138 See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text 
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always be readily apparent and not in conflict. Our goal in this Article has been 
to present an empirically informed guided tour of several of the available 
sources of Code policy. We have concluded that the comments are potentially 
the single best source for determining purposes and policies. But a 
comprehensive picture, based on the best available evidence, suggests that the 
comments are produced by a system that behaves quite differently from what is 
widely assumed. 
When we compare the UCC comments drafting process with that 
supporting analogous products of the sponsoring organizations, it becomes 
obvious that the official commentary afforded the greatest, perhaps even 
unwarranted, deference in the commercial law is the commentary supported by 
the least participatory drafting process. This is a significant shortcoming in the 
commercial law that was recognized, over half a century ago, by NCCUSL, 
but which still persists as the UCC has been substantially redrafted in the last 
decade. While it might not be appropriate to place all of the blame on the AU 
and NCCUSL for the role that the UCC comments have played in the 
commercial law, it is the sponsoring organizations that are in the best position 
to correct the incongruity. 
